The study of limits of sequences of finite structures plays a crucial role in finite model theory. It is motivated by an attempt to understand the behaviour of dynamical systems, such as computer networks evolving over time. For this purpose, starting in 2012, Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez have been developing a theory of structural limits of finite models. It is based on the insight that the collection of finite structures can be embedded in a space of measures, where the desired limits can be computed. This embedding they call the Stone pairing. We show that a closely related but finer grained space of measures arises -via Stone duality -by enriching the expressive power of the logic with certain "probabilistic operators". The consequences are two-fold. On the one hand, we identify the logical gist of the theory of structural limits. On the other hand, our construction shows that our duality-theoretic variant of the Stone pairing captures the adding of a layer of quantifiers, thus making a strong link to the recent work on semiring quantifiers in logic on words. These results connect two branches of logic in computer science which thus far have employed different techniques and tools: formal languages-and-logic on words and structural limits of finite models.
Introduction

Stone duality in logic
Stone duality provides a dual equivalence between bounded distributive lattices and certain topological spaces. It is a powerful and well established tool in the study of propositional logic and semantics of programming languages, see e.g. [13, 1] for major landmarks. In the study of first-order logic, Stone duality is not as omnipresent. Nevertheless, the theory of types in model theory, which is based on Stone duality, provides an important tool for first-order logic. We briefly recall this idea as it is closely related to, and provides the link between, two otherwise isolated occurrences of topological methods in theoretical computer science.
Consider a fixed signature σ and the ensuing first-order language, and a fixed first-order theory T in this language. For each n ∈ N, let Fm n denote the set of those first-order formulas of the logic whose free variables are among {v 1 , . . . , v n }, and let Mod n (T ) denote the class of all pairs (A, α) where A is a model of T and α is an interpretation of {v 1 , . . . , v n } in A. Then the satisfaction relation, (A, α) |= ϕ(v), is a binary relation from Mod n to Fm n . It induces the equivalence relations of elementary equivalence and logical equivalence on these sets, respectively. That is,
The quotient FO n (T ) = Fm n /≈ carries a natural Boolean algebra structure and is known as the n-th Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of T , while Typ n (T ) = Mod n /≡ is naturally endowed with a topology, generated by the sets ϕ(v) = {[(A, α)] | (A, α) |= ϕ(v)} for ϕ(v) ∈ Fm n , and is known as the space of n-types of T . Gödel's completeness theorem may now be stated as the fact that Typ n (T ) is the Stone dual of FO n (T ). The Boolean algebra FO(T ) of all first-order formulas modulo logical equivalence over T is the colimit (union) of the FO n (T ) for n ∈ N while its dual space, Typ(T ), is the inverse limit of the Typ n (T ) for n ∈ N which consists of T -models equipped with interpretations of all variables.
In theoretical computer science, finite models are particularly important. There are two equivalent approaches: e.g. at level 0 we can either consider the theory T f in of finite T -models, or the closure of the collection of all finite T -models in the space Typ 0 (T ). This closure yields a space, which should tell us about finite T -structures. Indeed, it is equal to Typ 0 (T f in ), the space of pseudofinite T -structures. For an application of this, see [14] .
Below, we will see an application in finite model theory of the case T = ∅ (in this case we write FO(σ) and Typ(σ) instead of FO(∅) and Typ(∅) to at least flag the signature).
Finite model theory and the Stone pairing
Finite model theory is the specialisation of model theory to finite structures. Many classical results of model theory, e.g. the compactness theorem, fail when restricted to finite models. For this reason, finite model theory has developed independently from model theory and the research communities, as well as the techniques, are in large part disjoint.
A central theme, in recent explorations in finite model theory, is the study of limits of finite structures. Assume we are interested in the behaviour of a biological system, or a computer network. These are modelled by finite graphs or, more generally, finite relational structures. As the system evolves over time, its limit properties are captured by the limit of the associated sequence of structures. Hence, we are interested in the asymptotic properties of a sequence of finite structures (A n ) n∈N , as n goes to infinity. If there is a suitable object A which encodes these asymptotic properties, then we can think of A as the limit of (A n ) n∈N . Jaroslav Nešetřil and Patrice Ossona de Mendez introduced the theory of structural limits as a general framework for studying limits of finite structures and have shown that it generalises many important notions of convergence appearing in the literature [18] . Their theory is based on the insight that finite structures can be embedded in a space of measures which is complete, thus providing the desired limit objects for all convergent sequences.
To illustrate how the embedding works, fix a finite σ-structure A. For every first-order formula ϕ (in the signature σ) with free variables v 1 , . . . , v n , define ϕ, A = |{a ∈ A n | (A, a) |= ϕ}| |A| n (the probability that a random assignment satisfies ϕ).
Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez view the assignment A → −, A as an embedding of finite structures into the space of probability measures on Typ(σ), which set-theoretically are finitely additive functions FO(σ) → [0, 1]. They call the ensuing embedding the Stone pairing, and the limit object for a sequence of finite structures (A n ) n∈N which embeds as a Cauchy sequence is the measure µ that the sequence −, A n converges to in this space of measures.
In light of the theory of types as exposed above, one may wonder whether this construction implicitly relies on a logic richer than first-order logic. One of our main contributions here consists in showing that this is indeed the case for a slight variant of Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez's construction.
Duality and logic on words
Spaces of measures, central to the theory of structural limits, arise naturally also in another field of logic in computer science, namely logic on words [4] . There, one regards words as finite models: w ∈ A * is seen as a relational structure on {1, . . . , |w|}, where |w| is the length of w, equipped with a unary relation P a , for each a ∈ A, singling out the positions in the word where the letter a appears. Every sentence ϕ, in a language interpretable over these structures, yields a language L ϕ ⊆ A * consisting of the words satisfying ϕ. Thus, each logic fragment is considered modulo the theory of finite words and the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras are subalgebras of ℘ (A * ) consisting of the appropriate L ϕ 's, see [14] .
In logic on words, one often goes beyond first-order logic and, for lack of logical completeness, the duals of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras are not defined in terms of models. Nevertheless, the dual spaces, which act as compactifications and completions of the collections of models, provide a very powerful tool for studying logic fragments (and other classes of interest) by topological means. The central notion is that of recognition. Even though it was not originally thought of in this way, this is fundamentally a notion of Stone duality in that a Boolean subalgebra B ⊆ ℘ (A * ) of languages of interest is studied by means of the dual map η : β(A * ) → X B . Here β(A * ) is the Stone dual of ℘ (A * ), also known in topology as the Čech-Stone compactification of the discrete space on A * , and X B is the Stone dual of B. The properties of Čech-Stone compactifications imply that A * embeds in β(A * ) yielding a map η 0 : A * → X B which uniquely determines η. Now, Stone duality implies that L ⊆ A * is in B if and only if there is a clopen subset V ⊆ X B so that η −1 0 (V ) = L. Anytime the latter is true for a map η and an L as above, one says that η recognises L.
A fundamental question in the study of logic fragments is the following inductive step: given a notion of quantifier and a recogniser for the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of some Boolean fragment of formulas with a free variable, construct a recogniser for the new Boolean fragment generated by the formulas obtained by applying the quantifier to the original fragment. This problem was solved in [7] , by using duality theory, in a quite general setting which allows semiring quantifiers. The latter are defined as follows: let (S, +, ·, 0 S , 1 S ) be a semiring, and k ∈ S. Given a formula ψ(v), the formula ∃ S,k v.ψ(v) is true of a word w ∈ A * iff k = 1 S + · · · + 1 S , m times, where m is the number of assignments of the variable v in w which make ψ(v) true. If S = Z/qZ, we obtain the so-called modular quantifiers, and for S the two-element lattice we recover the usual existential quantifier.
In logic on words, formulas with a free variable are recognised by maps of the form f : β((A × 2) * ) → X (the extra bit in A × 2 is used to mark the interpretation of the free variable). In [7] , it was shown that
for every k ∈ S, where S(X) is the space of finitely additive S-valued measures on X and the map R assigns to a word w ∈ A * the measure µ w : ℘ ((A × 2) * ) → S sending a set K ⊆ (A × 2) * to the sum 1 S + · · · + 1 S , n w,K times. Here, n w,K is the number of interpretations α of the free variable v in w such that the pair (w, α), seen as an element of (A × 2) * , belongs to K. Finally, S(f ) sends a measure to its pushforward along f .
Note that, being beyond the scope of this paper, we have suppressed a large and important part of the topological theory of logic on words in not mentioning the monoid structures available for the spaces (in the form of profinite monoids or BiMs, cf. [14, 7] ).
Our contribution
In logic on words, using Stone duality and the paradigm of model theoretic types, we have seen that adding a layer of a semiring quantifier yields semiring-valued measures. It is therefore natural to ask whether the approach of Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez also can be naturally explained as "adding a layer of quantifiers" in a suitable enrichment of first-order logic. The main contribution of this paper is to show that this is essentially the case.
More precisely, we will see that the Stone pairing A → −, A of Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez can be viewed as a map into a space of measures with values in an ordered space which we call Γ. The space Γ is obtained from the images of the measures −, A , and is finer grained than [0, 1] as the (non-zero) rational points are doubled. This allows us to see the Stone pairing as an embedding into the space of types for the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of a certain logic. On the other hand, our construction is related to Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez's Stone pairing by a retraction-section pair which allows the transfer of properties.
Outline of the paper In section 2 we briefly recall Priestley duality for distributive lattices. In Section 3 we introduce the Priestley space Γ with its additional operations, and show that it admits [0, 1] as a retract. The spaces of Γ-valued measures are introduced in Section 4, and the retraction of Γ onto [0, 1] is lifted to the appropriate spaces of measures. In Section 5 we introduce the Γ-valued Stone pairing and make the link with logic on words. Further, we compare convergence in the space of Γ-valued measures with the one considered by Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez. Finally, in Section 6 we show that constructing the space of Γ-valued measures dually corresponds to enriching the logic with probabilistic operators.
For a subset S ⊆ X, f S : S → Y is the obvious restriction. Given any set T , ℘ (T ) denotes its power-set. Further, for a poset P , P ∂ is the poset obtained by turning the order of P upside down.
Preliminaries on duality
In this paper we will need Stone duality for bounded distributive lattices in the order topological form due to Priestley [22] . We briefly recall how this duality works.
A compact ordered space is a pair (X, ≤) where X is a compact space and ≤ is a partial order on X which is closed in the product topology of X × X. (Note that such a space is automatically Hausdorff). A compact ordered space is a Priestley space provided it is totally order-disconnected. That is, for all x, y ∈ X such that x ≤ y, there is a clopen (i.e. simultaneously closed and open) C ⊆ X which is an up-set for ≤, and satisfies x ∈ C but y / ∈ C. We recall the construction of the Priestley space of a distributive lattice D.
Remark. We assume all distributive lattices are bounded, with the bottom and top denoted by 0 and 1, respectively. Also, we require that lattice homomorphisms preserve the bounds.
A non-empty proper subset F ⊂ D is a prime filter if it is (i) upward closed (in the natural order of D), (ii) closed under finite meets, and
Denote by X D the set of all prime filters of D. By Stone's Prime Filter Theorem, the map
is an embedding. Priestley's insight was that D can be recovered from X D , if the latter is equipped with the inclusion order and the topology generated by the sets of the form a , and their complements. This makes X D into a Priestley space -the dual space of D -and the map is an isomorphism between D and the lattice of clopen up-sets of X D . Conversely, any Priestley space X is the dual space of the lattice of its clopen up-sets. We call the latter the dual lattice of X. This correspondence extends to morphisms. In fact, Priestley duality states that the category of distributive lattices with homomorphisms is dually equivalent to the category of Priestley spaces and continuous monotone maps. When restricting to Boolean algebras, we recover the celebrated Stone duality restricted to Boolean algebras and Boolean spaces, i.e. compact Hausdorff spaces in which the clopen subsets form a basis.
3
The space Γ Central to our results is a Priestley space Γ closely related to [0, 1], in which our measures will take values. Its construction comes from the insight that the range of the Stone pairing −, A , for a finite structure A and formulas restricted to a fixed number of free variables, can be confined to a chain {0, 1 n , 2 n , . . . , 1}. We construct Γ as the inverse limit of all those chains (identifying fractions representing the same value), to accommodate all possible choices of A.
Alternatively, the space Γ is obtained via Priestley duality from the lattice L constructed as the filtered colimit (directed union) of the dual lattices of the finite chains. It is readily seen that L has the following presentation:
By definition, the points of Γ are the prime filters of L. Since L is totally ordered, all proper filters are prime. In turn, proper filters correspond to the partitions of Q ∩ [0, 1] of the form (D, U ), with D a down-set and U a non-empty up-set. There are three possible scenarios: (i) D and U are Dedekind sections of an irrational r ∈ (0, 1), (ii) D and U are Dedekind sections of a rational q ∈ (0, 1] with q ∈ D, and (iii) D and U are Dedekind sections of a rational q ∈ [0, 1] with q ∈ U . Thus, we can represent the space Γ as based on the set
The points of the form r − correspond to the situations (i) and (ii), and those of the form q • arise from (iii). The natural order of Γ is the unique total order which has 0 • as bottom element, satisfies r * < s * if and only if r < s for * ∈ {−, •}, and such that q • is a cover of q − for every rational q ∈ (0, 1] (i.e. q − < q • , and there is no element strictly in between). Cf. Figure 1 . The topology of Γ is generated by the sets of the form
The lattice L and its Priestley dual Γ
(L, ⊕) and its dual (Γ, −, ∼)
When defining measures we need to have a plus operation available on the space of values. Since the lattice L and the space Γ are similar to each other, they are equipped with both plus and minus operations. These operations form adjoint pairs, thus they determine each other. Given the way duality theory for additional operations is treated, e.g. in [13] , it makes most sense for us to take plus as the primary structure on L, and minus on Γ. Thus, we equip L with a binary operation ⊕ : L × L → L extending + defined as follows:
In extended Priestley duality [13] , operations on a distributive lattice that preserve either join or meet coordinate-wise correspond to certain relations with topological and order theoretic properties on the dual space. If an operation is coordinate-wise both join and meet preserving, then, as was shown in [9, 10] , it is witnessed by a partial operation. This applies in the case of (L, ⊕) and the dual partial operation is as given in the following lemma.
Remark. Note that, except for r − − s • , the expression x − y gives a • -value whenever the difference is rational, and a − -value otherwise.
As was also shown in [9, 10] , a second partial operation enables a simpler description of the characteristic properties of the dual space. In the case of (L, ⊕) this operation is given by
(Cf. Lemma 25 in Section A). In particular, the order theoretic and topological properties of the dual relations, as spelled out in [13] , become the properties given in the following lemma. First, we recall that a map into an ordered topological space is lower (resp. Proof. The first part of 1 holds because, by definition, the order relation of a Priestley space is closed in the product topology. The second part of item 1, as well as item 2, are immediate from the definitions. For item 3, fix an arbitrary q ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1]. We claim that
which is readily seen to be an open subset of dom(−). For a proof of the claim, see Section B.1. The proof of item 4 is the same, mutatis mutandis, as for item 3.
The retraction Γ [0, 1]
In this section we show that, with respect to appropriate topologies, the unit interval [0, 1] can be obtained as a topological retract of Γ, in a way which is compatible with the operation −. Let us define the monotone surjection given by collapsing the doubled elements:
The map γ has a right adjoint, given by
Indeed, it is readily seen that γ(y) ≤ x iff y ≤ ι • (x), for all y ∈ Γ and x ∈ [0, 1]. (Note that γ also has a left adjoint, though we shall not define it explicitly here). The composition γ · ι • coincides with the identity on [0, 1], i.e. ι • is a section of γ.
Next, we show that the maps γ and ι • are minus-morphisms between (Γ, −) and the unit interval [0, 1] equipped with the usual minus operation x − y defined whenever y ≤ x. Also, γ is a minus morphism between (Γ, ∼) and [0, 1]. Lemma 4. The following statements hold: 1. the mapping γ : (Γ, −) → ([0, 1], −) is a continuous minus-morphism; 2. the mapping γ : (Γ, ∼) → ([0, 1], −) is a continuous minus-morphism; 3. the mapping ι • : ([0, 1], −) → (Γ, −) is a lower semicontinuous minus-morphism.
Proof sketch. Showing that γ is a minus-morphism is immediate in both items 1 and 2. To check continuity observe that, for a rational q ∈ (0, 1), γ −1 (q, 1] and γ −1 [0, q) are equal to 
The latter property is equivalently expressed as
We write M c (D) for the set of all measures D → [0, 1], and regard it as an ordered topological space, with the structure induced by the product order and product topology of [0, 1] D . The notion of (finitely additive, probability) Γ-valued measure is analogous to the classical one, except that the finite additivity property (5) splits into two conditions, involving − and ∼.
We denote by M(D) or M(X) the subset of Γ D consisting of the measures µ : D → Γ.
Remark. In the theory of structural limits, Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez consider only measures on Boolean subalgebras of FO(σ). Indeed, in their framework convergence with respect to a sublattice of FO(σ) entails converge with respect to the generated Boolean subalgebra of FO(σ) [19, Prop. 3] . This is not true for Γ-valued measures, cf. Section 5.2.
Since Γ is a Priestley space, so is Γ D equipped with the product order and topology. Hence, we regard M(D) as an ordered topological space, whose topology and order are induced by those of Γ D . In fact M(D) is even a Priestley space:
Proof sketch. It suffices to show that M(D) is a closed subspace of Γ D . First, let us define
which corresponds to the first two conditions in Definition 7. We show that this is a closed subspace of Γ D . Note that the evaluation maps ev a : Γ D → Γ, f → f (a), are continuous for every a ∈ D. The first set in the intersection defining C 1,2 is closed because it is the equaliser of the evaluation map ev 0 , and the constant map of value 0 • . Similarly, for the set
is closed in Γ D by Lemma 26 in the appendix. Note that the latter lemma applies because − is lower semicontinuous, and ∼ is upper semicontinuous (Lemma 2).
The construction of the space of measures is functorial, and turns directed colimits into codirected limits. This property is especially useful when approximating a fragment of a logic by smaller fragments (see, e.g., Section 5.1). For a proof, see Section B.2 in the appendix. Remark. By duality, the category of distributive lattices is dually equivalent to the category of Priestley spaces, so we can think of M as acting on either. Traditionally in analysis, and also in the works of Nešetřil and Ossona de Mendez, M is viewed as acting on the space side. However, as it is concretely defined on the lattice side, we work with M as a contravariant functor from lattices to spaces (rather than as a covariant functor on spaces).
Recall the maps γ : Γ → [0, 1] and ι • : [0, 1] → Γ from equations (3)-(4). In Section 3.2 we showed that these maps are a retraction-section pair. In Theorem 13 this retraction is lifted to the spaces of measures. We start with an easy observation (for a proof, see Section B.2): (FO(σ) ). In this section we introduce Γ-valued finitely supported functions, and use them in Section 5.1 to define a Γ-valued version of −, A . Hereafter we make a notational difference, writing −, − c for the [0,1]-valued Stone pairing. We will also argue that the constructions underlying the Γ-valued Stone pairing and the recognisers arising from semiring quantifiers in logic on words are one and the same construction. Finally, in Section 5.2 we compare the notions of convergence in M c (FO(σ)) and M(FO(σ)).
To start with, we point out that the partial operation − on Γ uniquely determines a partial "plus" operation on Γ. Define To improve readability, whenever the sum y 1 + · · · + y m exists in Γ, we denote it by assigning to every f ∈ F(X) the measure Write Fin(σ) for the set of all finite σ-structures. We have a map Fin(σ) → F(Typ n (σ)) defined by A → f A n , where f A n is the function
The Γ-valued Stone pairing and logic on words
By Lemma 16, we get a measure f A n : ℘ (Typ n (σ)) → Γ. Now, for every ϕ ∈ FO n (σ), let ϕ n ⊆ Typ n (σ) be the set of (equivalence classes of) σ-structures with interpretations satisfying ϕ. We obtain the usual Stone embedding n : FO n (σ) → ℘ (Typ n (σ)).
Restricting
Summing up, we have the composite map
Essentially the same construction is featuring in logic on words, cf. equation (1):
The set of finite σ-structures Fin(σ) corresponds to the set of finite words A * . The collection Typ n (σ) of (equivalence classes of) σ-structures with interpretations corresponds to (A × 2) * or, interchangeably, β(A × 2) * (in the case of one free variable). The fragment FO n (σ) of first-order logic corresponds to the Boolean algebra of languages, defined by formulas with a free variable, dual to the Boolean space X appearing in (1). The first map in the composite (6) sends a finite structure A to the measure f A n which, when evaluated on a set K ⊆ Typ n (σ), counts the (proportion of) interpretations α : {v 1 , . . . , v n } → A such that (A, α) ∈ K, similarly to R from (1).
Finally, the second map in (6) sends a measure in M( ℘ (Typ n (σ))) to its pushforward along n : FO n (σ) → ℘ (Typ n (σ)). This is the second map in the composition (1).
On the other hand, the assignment A → µ A n defined in (6) is also closely related to the classical Stone pairing. Indeed, for every formula ϕ in FO n (σ),
In this sense, µ A n can be regarded as a Γ-valued Stone pairing, relative to the fragment FO n (σ). Next, we show how to extend this to the full first-order logic FO(σ). First, we observe that the construction is invariant under extensions of the set of free variables. 
Fix an arbitrary finite structure A ∈ Fin(σ). Let ϕ be a formula in FO(σ) with free variables among {v 1 , . . . , v n }, for some n ∈ N. By construction, ϕ, A = µ A n (ϕ). Therefore, by equation (7), ϕ, A = ( ϕ, A c ) • . The statement then follows at once. The converse is not true. For example, consider the signature σ = {<} consisting of a single binary relation symbol. Let A 1 = {0, 1} and < A1 = {(0, 1)}. For even i, A i is obtained from A i−1 by adding an unrelated element e. Next, A i+1 extends the interpretation of < Ai to a strict total order with top element e. In this manner we construct a sequence of finite structures (A n ) n∈N . The first elements of the sequence are displayed in the picture below.
Limits in the space of measures
Consider the formula ψ(x) ≈ ∀y ¬(x < y) ∧ ∃z ¬(z < x) ∧ ¬(z = x) stating that x is maximal but not the maximum in the order given by <. Then, for the sublattice D = {f , ψ, t} of FO(σ) the sequences of the −, A n 's and the −, A n c 's converge in M(D) and M c (D), respectively. However, if we consider the Boolean algebra B = {f , ψ, ¬ψ, t}, then the −, A n 's no longer converge whereas the −, A n c 's still do. For details see Claim 27 in the appendix.
Next, identify Fin(σ) with a subset of M(FO(σ)) (resp. M c (FO(σ) )) through −, − (resp. −, − c ). A central question in the theory of structural limits, see e.g. [20] , is to determine the closure of Fin(σ) in M c (FO(σ) ). The following theorem gives an answer to this question in terms of the corresponding question for M (FO(σ) ). The zero-one law for first-order logic [12, 5] states that the sequence (γ·µ n ) n∈N ⊆ M c (FO 0 (σ)) converges pointwise and, for every ϕ ∈ FO 0 (σ), lim n (γ · µ n )(ϕ) ⊆ {0, 1}. That is, ϕ is almost surely true or almost surely false. This result, and many variants of it, can be proved by defining a certain theory E = {ε i | i ∈ I} of extension axioms and showing that (i) each ε i is almost surely true, (ii) E has, up to isomorphism, only one countably infinite model M , and (iii) a sentence is true in M iff it is almost surely true. One can show that E induces a natural filter of subsets of the space M(FO 0 (σ)) which does not converge because the topology is "too rich". However, when projected onto the space M c (FO 0 (σ)), it converges to a {0, 1}-valued measure, thus yielding the zero-one law.
6
The logic of measures Consider the following conditions, for arbitrary elements p, q, r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] and a, b ∈ D.
(L1) p ≤ q implies P ≥q a |= P ≥p a (L2) P ≥p f |= whenever p > 0, and |=
With respect to the interpretation in equation (8) Proof sketch. Items (L2) and (L3) take care of the first two conditions defining Γ-valued measures (cf. Definition 7) . We prove the first half of the third condition, as the other half is proved in a similar fashion. We must show that, for every a, b ∈ D,
In view of the fact that x − ( ) transforms non-empty joins into meets (Lemma 23), and
To settle equation (10), it is enough to show that, provided
The latter inequality is equivalent to (p + q − r) • ≤ µ F (a ∨ b) by Lemma 14. In turn, using (L4) and the fact that F is a prime filter, P ≥p a, P ≥q b ∈ F and P ≥r (a ∧ b) /
We can now describe the dual lattice of M(D) as the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for the logic PL D , built from the propositional variables P ≥p a by imposing the laws (L1)-(L5). For the proof of the following theorem, see Section B.4. We also add a new rule, stating that P <q a is the negation of P ≥q a: (L6) P <q a ∧ P ≥q a |= and |= P <q a ∨ P ≥q a Clearly, (L6) is satisfied in M(D). Further, it is not difficult to see that the Boolean algebra of clopens of M(D) is isomorphic to the quotient of the free distributive lattice on the set
with respect to the congruence generated by the conditions (L1)-(L6).
Specialising to FO(σ). Let us briefly discuss what happens when we instantiate D with the full first-order logic FO(σ). For a formula ϕ ∈ FO(σ) with free variables v 1 , . . . , v n and a q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], we have two new sentences P ≥q ϕ and P <q ϕ. Then, for example, for a finite σ-structure A identified with its Γ-valued Stone pairing −, A ,
In other words, P ≥q ϕ is true of A if a random assignment of the variables v 1 , . . . , v n in A satisfies ϕ with probability at least q. Similarly for P <q ϕ. It thus makes sense to regard P ≥q and P <q as probabilistic quantifiers that bind all free variables of a given formula.
Conclusion
We replace the unit interval by a closely related but finer grained Priestley topological algebra Γ as the set of values for finitely additive probability measures. As a consequence, our spaces of Γ-valued measures over Priestley (resp. Boolean) spaces are themselves again Priestley (resp. Boolean). Further, by describing the Priestley dual of the construction of M(X) from X (cf. Definition 7), we obtain a Lindenbaum-Tarski construction of P(D) from D which augments the "logic" given by D with certain probabilistic operators. The consequences are two-fold. On the one hand, we identify the logical gist of the theory of structural limits showing that the Stone pairing of [19, 21] has a logical interpretation. On the other hand, our construction shows that our duality-theoretic variant of the Stone pairing captures the adding of a layer of quantifiers, thus making a tight link to the recent work on semiring quantifiers in logic on words [7, 8] . These results connect two branches of logic in computer science which thus far have employed different techniques and tools: formal languages and logic on words on one hand and structural limits of finite models on the other. Further, the unifying point of view is that of the theory of types from classical model theory.
Although we were driven only by duality theory, the logic we obtain appears to be related to a number of logics with probability quantifiers available in the literature, e.g. [15, 6, 23] . It would be interesting to further explore these connections. Moreover, the combination of Theorems 19 and 22 may provide an insight towards a characterisation of those measures that are in the closure of the finite structures, a central open question in the theory of structural limits [20] . Indeed, since M(FO(σ)) is a Priestley space, the closure of Fin(σ) in M(FO(σ)) corresponds to a quotient of the dual lattice P (FO(σ) ). That is, there is a theory T in the language of P(FO(σ)) whose models are precisely the measures in the closure of Fin(σ).
It would also be interesting to investigate whether the limits of database schemas introduced by Kolaitis et al. [16] is amenable to a treatment similar to the one given here. Finally, we would want to explore the connections with other modern approaches to finite model theory, such as those recently put forward by Abramsky et al. [2, 3] . Proof. Fix x ∈ Γ. We must prove that, for any non-empty set
Reverse the order of Γ, and denote by f the function x − ( ) seen as a map [0 • , x] → Γ ∂ . We must prove that
The lattice [0 • , x] is linearly ordered, hence each of its subsets is directed. Equation (11) That is, f is Scott continuous. 
For the benefit of the reader we include an explicit description of the partial operation ∼ on Γ, which was defined in terms of − in equation (2) . 
Proof. For every x ∈ Γ we have x ∼ x = ∅ = 0 • . Otherwise, fix arbitrary elements x, y ∈ dom(−) such that x = y. That is, y < x. There are four cases, depending on whether x and y are of • -type, or of − -type:
Lemma 26. Let X, Y be compact ordered spaces, f : X → Y a lower semicontinuous function and g : X → Y an upper semicontinuous function. If X is a closed subset of X,
Proof. It suffices to show that the set {x ∈ X | g(x) ≤ f (x)} is closed in X, for then E is obtained by taking the intersection with the closed set X . 
which converges to 0 • in Γ. That is, the sequence (A n ) n∈N converges in M(D) and therefore also in M c (D). For the negation of ψ we obtain the sequence
To see that it does not converge in Γ, observe that both the clopen ↓1 − and its complement ↑1 • contain infinitely many elements in the sequence above. (Since 1 • is an isolated point of Γ, if the sequence ( ¬ψ, A n ) n converged to 1 • , then we could find a k such that ¬ψ, A n = 1 • for all n ≥ k). Nevertheless, the sequence γ # ( ¬ψ, A n ) = ¬ψ, A n c converges to 1 in [0, 1] and so the sequence of the −, A n c 's converges in M c (B).
B Omitted proofs
B.1 Proofs from Section 3
Proof sketch of Lemma 1. Following Section 2.2 in [13] , every join-hemimorphism D n → D on a distributive lattice D induces an (n + 1)-ary relation on the dual space X D . In our case, ⊕ : L × L → L is a join-hemimorphism and so we have the relation 
which are both open subsets of M(E).
Next, we show that M sends directed colimits to codirected limits. Let D be the colimit of the directed diagram {h i,j : D i → D j } i≤j with the embeddings ι i : D i → D. We assume, without loss of generality, that all the homomorphisms are injective. To show that M(D) is the limit of the diagram
i≤j let Y be a Priestley space and {g i : Y → M(D i )} i a set of Priestley morphisms such that g i = M(h i,j ) · g j , for every i ≤ j. We need to prove that there is a unique Priestley morphism ξ : Y → M(D) such that M(ι i ) · ξ = g i for every i.
By definition, for every element a ∈ D there are i and a i ∈ D i such that ι i (a i ) = a. Because D is the colimit of the D i 's, for any other choice a j ∈ D j such that ι j (a j ) = a, we have that h i,k (a i ) = h j,k (a j ) for some k ≥ i, j. Then, for every y ∈ Y , g i (y)(a i ) = g k (y)(h i,k (a i )) = g k (y)(h j,k (a j )) = g j (y)(a j ). As a result, the following map is well-defined:
where i is any index such that there is an a i ∈ D i with ι i (a i ) = a. Observe that, for every y ∈ Y , ξ(y) is a measure D → Γ. For example, let a, b ∈ D. Then, by directedness, there exists an index i such that a = ι i (a i ) and
The other properties are proved in the same spirit. Next, we show that ξ is a Priestley morphism. With respect to monotonicity, let y ≤ y in Y and a i ∈ D i , for some index i. Then, ξ(y)(ι i (a i )) = g i (y)(a i ) ≤ g i (y )(a i ) = ξ(y )(ι i (a i )). For continuity, given any a i ∈ D i and q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1],
Similarly, one can show that Then, for every a ∈ D and q ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1],
which is an open set in M c (D) ↓ . This concludes the proof.
B.3 Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Lemma 14. For the definability part, let (x, y) ∈ dom(+) and x + y ≤ z. Since y ≤ x + y we have that y ≤ z and so (z, y) ∈ dom(−). Conversely, if (z, y) ∈ dom(−) and x ≤ z − y, by monotonicity of ( ) − y, z − y ≤ 1 • − y and so x ≤ 1 • − y.
Proof of Lemma 16. We need to prove that f is a measure, for every f ∈ F(X). We see that ∅ f = 0 • and X f = 1 • by definition. Moreover, M → M f is monotone because x ≤ x + y for every (x, y) ∈ dom(+). Lastly, we must show that, for any M, N ⊆ X, 
If µ does not satisfy |= P ≥r (a ∧ b), i.e. µ(a ∧ b) ≤ r − , then
Since + is the left adjoint of − (Lemma 14) we have (x − y) + y ≤ x whenever the expression makes sense. Therefore,
(L5) The proof is the same, mutatis mutandis, as for the previous item. Indeed, suppose Proof of Theorem 22. Let X P(D) be the space dual to P(D). By Proposition 21 there is a map ϑ : X P(D) → M(D), F → µ F . We claim that ϑ is an isomorphism of Priestley space. Clearly, ϑ is monotone. Now, suppose µ F1 (a) ≤ µ F2 (a) for some a ∈ D. We have
where the last equality holds in view of the following claim.
Claim. Let F ⊆ P(D) be a prime filter. For every a ∈ D,
Proof. Fix an arbitrary a ∈ D. By (L1) it follows at once that
Suppose by contradiction that the inequality is strict. Then there is r ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1] such that
If P ≥r a ∈ F , then r − = {q • | P ≥q a ∈ F } ≥ r • , a contradiction. Similarly, if P ≥r a / ∈ F we get r • = {p − | P ≥p a / ∈ F } ≤ r − , a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
Equation (17) implies the existence of p, q satisfying P ≥q a ∈ F 1 , P ≥p a / ∈ F 2 and q ≥ p. It follows by (L1) that P ≥p a ∈ F 1 . We conclude that P ≥p a ∈ F 1 \ F 2 , whence F 1 ⊆ F 2 . This shows that ϑ is an order embedding, whence injective.
We prove that ϑ is also surjective, thus a bijection. Fix a measure µ ∈ M(D). It is not difficult to see, using Lemma 20, that the filter F µ ⊆ P(D) generated by the set which is again a clopen of X P(D) .
